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Striking Back Against Corporate Education Reform: The 2012 Chicago Teachers Union Strike 
 
Kurt Hilgendorf 
Chicago Teachers Union 
 
Soon after the Chicago Teachers Union’s (CTU) House of Delegates voted to suspend the union’s 
seven-day September 2012 strike, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel blanketed local television 
airwaves with $1 million in paid advertising funded by Democrats for Education Reform, a New 
York-based “Astroturf” organization heavily financed by hedge fund operators. In the ad, Emanuel 
claims that though negotiations were difficult, “more accountability is the right deal for our kids.”1 
Aside from being a mild nuisance to primetime TV viewers, the commercial became a 
conversation piece among Chicago residents. Common questions included “why is the mayor 
running a TV commercial?”, “why did teachers go on strike if the district’s offers were so great?”, 
and “why is the mayor spending so much on a TV ad at the same time he claims the schools are 
broke?” The best answer for a famously poll driven politician such as Emanuel likely had to do 
with public opinion: during the union’s first strike in twenty-five years, Chicago Public Schools 
(CPS) parents supported teachers 2-to-1 over the mayor.2  
 
Emanuel’s language was deliberate. Accountability is an intoxicating buzzword for 
supporters of a particular kind of educational reform and in the national imagination the 2012 
Chicago teachers’ strike was a test of this long-running education reform agenda. Under the 
accountability paradigm, teachers (especially teachers in urban schools) have neglected their 
students’ best interests because tenure rules ensure lifetime job security. In the process, (urban) 
students to fall farther and farther behind their more affluent American peers and the entire U.S. 
education system suffers in international comparisons. The solution is to hold teachers 
accountable with a behaviorist reward system that rests on the logic of loss aversion. Teachers 
either push students’ standardized test scores up or they face sanctions up to and including 
termination. Chicago’s teachers challenged this logic through their resistance to key elements of 
corporate reform, as well as their questioning of whether non-educators were really best positioned 
to make decisions about how schools should be organized and operated.  
 
The logic of teacher accountability has a veneer of what Antonio Gramsci termed 
“common sense”, or a belief that policies that benefit society’s elites are also optimal for all 
members of society.3 Deeper analysis of educational reform suggests that such uniform opinion is 
far from developed. Highly visible public challenges to common sense can provoke strong 
reactions, and the 2012 Chicago teachers strike sparked a national conversation on education 
reform. Every major TV news network had a significant presence on the strike’s first days, and 
media across the country covered the action. Opinions on the strike dramatically differed. The 
                                                   
1 YouTube. “Rahm Emanuel TV ad on CTU Strike.” Accessed January 13, 2013. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDanfqZkie4 
2 Miller, Rich. “No Hugo, they’re not ‘supremely unhappy…’ Yet.” CapitolFax, September 13, 2012. Accessed January 
13, 2013. http://capitolfax.com/2012/09/13/no-hugo-theyre-not-supremely-unhappy-yet/ 
3 Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers. 2007.  
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Chicago Tribune, a noted supporter of both Emanuel and corporate-style educational governance, 
argued in a subtly-titled editorial (“Chicago Teachers Union Fighting Inevitability of Education 
Reform”) that the CTU was “denying the arc of history” and that “CPS isn’t pushing the envelope 
here. It’s playing catch up.”4 The Tribune’s perspective is hardly universal, though, and its attempt 
to establish a limited discourse points to a lack of consensus and a developing public debate about 
corporate school reform.  Articles like one in The Nation (“Chicago Teachers Push Back Against 
Neoliberal Education Reform”) show a divergent viewpoint. “29,000 Chicago teachers and 
education professionals are on strike – demanding both a fair contract and a radically different 
vision of school reform” (emphasis original).5 That such a national discussion occurred in the first 
place speaks to the impact education reform policies have had primarily in low-income African 
American and Latino neighborhoods in cities across the country. It was especially interesting that 
such a conversation originated in Chicago, for two reasons: first, and most directly, a restrictive 
Illinois law restricts Chicago’s teachers’ legal strike issues to pay and benefits; second, and more 
powerfully, many of the current national reform policies proliferated outward from Chicago. 
 
CTU President Karen Lewis repeatedly described the strike as “a battle for the soul of 
public education.” Her characterization describes a history of school governance conflicts in 
Chicago dating back to the late nineteenth century. While the contours of these issues have 
changed, the fundamental conflicts are still unresolved: who should control education in Chicago 
(and the country) and what should school look like? This essay examines the recent history of 
corporate education reform in Chicago from 1995 to the present, assesses the effectiveness of 
those reforms, and evaluates the strike’s impact on the current wave of corporate school reform. 
The CTU strike was the largest teacher-led challenge to date to the current wave of corporate 
school reform and served as a spark for further challenges to public education’s status quo. The 
strike directly challenged corporate school reform elements like the imposition of a narrow, basic 
skills curriculum for students of color and firing teachers based on student test scores, and 
inspired resistance to other elements of corporate reform like a myopic focus on testing, sorting, 
and ranking students and teachers, the national curriculum standards known as the Common 
Core, and the idea that non-educators’ ideas for education reform are superior to those who have 
done the hard work of teaching children.  
 
I was far from an impartial observer during the strike. I taught history, economics, and 
psychology, and coached high school debate for more than six years in the Chicago Public Schools. 
I have witnessed the effects of corporate school reform first-hand. I spent the vast majority of my 
teaching career working in the Englewood neighborhood on Chicago’s South Side, an area known 
for economic disinvestment, gun violence, and challenging schools. I was laid-off from my first job 
                                                   
4 Dold, R. Bruce. “Chicago Teachers Union fighting inevitability of education reform” (editorial). Chicago Tribune. 
September 13, 2012. Accessed January 13, 2013. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-09-13/news/ct-edit-arc-
0913-jm-20120913_1_education-reform-teacher-evaluations-student-growth 
5 Cunningham-Cook, Matthew. “Chicago Teachers Push Back Against Neoliberal Education Reform.” The Nation. 
September 11, 2012. Retrieved January 13, 2013. http://www.thenation.com/article/169859/chicago-teachers-push-
back-against-neoliberal-education-reform# 
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at Englewood High School because it was a “failing school.” I then moved to John Hope High 
School. Hope was subjected to multiple corporate reform interventions, like the supplemental 
education services mandated by the federal No Child Left Behind law and an insulting scripted 
curriculum known as High School Transformation. In my fourth year at Hope, I was laid-off 
because of enrollment declines that stemmed in part from the proliferation of charter schools in 
the neighborhood. I was fortunately rehired at the end of the summer, and I would have been laid-
off for a third time the following year had I not been hired at Von Steuben High School on the 
other side of the city. I became more directly involved with the CTU when I was appointed chair 
of the union’s school finance and taxation committee in 2010. I served on the CTU’s “big 
bargaining team” with forty other rank-and-file teachers during the most recent contract 
negotiations. While we were not involved in most of the direct negotiations, we regularly consulted 
with the primary bargaining team between February 2012 and the end of the strike. Since the 
summer of 2012 I have worked full-time for the CTU as a policy researcher and lobbyist. During 
the strike, I walked picket lines at schools, helped with strike logistics, organized demonstrations at 
elected officials’ offices, participated in a talk-radio call in show at Arizona State University, and 
actively discussed contract proposals during negotiating sessions. No history is objective, and my 
experiences clearly and necessarily impact my interpretation of the strike’s role in the wider 
education reform context.  
 
Defining Corporate School Reform  
 
In this essay, corporate school reform refers to a suite of changes in educational governance 
tied far more to labor management and proficiency targets than to improvements in the actual 
process of teaching and learning. Corporate school reform’s governance changes include the 
replacement of experienced educational administrators with business managers and executives, the 
establishment and refinement of predetermined educational standards, changes in decision-
making (either centralization or decentralization, depending on the moment) that provide more 
authority to management, privatization of public assets and employment through the expansion of 
market-based school choice models (primarily charter schools and job outsourcing), policy making 
driven by quantitative data derived mainly through school statistics like attendance rates and test 
scores, punitive accountability measures for teachers and schools, and an attempt to de-skill the 
teaching profession through pre-packaged curricula and a push toward younger, inexperienced 
teachers.  
 
It is important to note that corporate school reform is not a new education agenda but 
rather a creatively-messaged twist on century-old ideas. Dorothy Shipps calls this process 
managerialism:  
 
a dominant business reform agenda – managerialism – emerged in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries and has been remarkably influential in shaping the structure of 
Chicago’s schools ever since. Business leaders brought their expertise as senior managers to 
the coalitions they joined or led, steering agendas toward a prominent role for executives 
who directed a hierarchy below them and adjusted accountability sanctions and rewards…. 
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The idea that a large urban school system can be substantially improved through better 
management has remained essentially unchanged.6  
 
Alternatively, this model has been called the “New Taylorism,” as teachers’ professional roles are 
limited to a narrow range of predictable, easily measured outputs usually tied to standardized 
testing. Instruction is directed toward increased scores, and success is measured only by a teacher’s 
effectiveness in this single task.7 Teachers oppose this reform model because it reduces professional 
autonomy, narrows the curriculum to what is tested, increases pressure to meet what many feel are 
dubious targets, increases teacher and student stress loads, actively rejects the impacts of wide 
disparities in family and school resources, and has yet to produce the promised results. That 
educational results are lacking is no surprise; fundamental gains in educational outcomes have not 
followed corporate school reform because the governance model does not directly address many 
out-of-school levers, often related to family income, that significantly impact student attainment, 
such as adequate mental and physical healthcare, a supportive and stable home environment, 
neighborhood safety, and enriching educational opportunities outside of school. Despite 
practitioners’ resistance, policymakers, buoyed (or swayed) by massive donations, intense lobbying, 
and the relative ease of making decisions based on snapshot quantitative measures of complex 
social interactions, have embraced the corporate model.  
 
While the staying power of this particular iteration of corporate school reform is an open 
question, two additional elements define its specific contours and geography. First, the bulk of 
corporate school reform efforts are directed primarily at a small subset of public schools in urban 
areas: schools that serve primarily low-income African American and Latino students. Secretary of 
Education Arne Duncan has called these schools the “bottom five percent.”8 The racial 
components of corporate school reforms are undeniable. Recent federal education policies  No 
Child Left Behind (NCLB) and Race to the Top (RTTT) were framed as a quest for racial justice, 
overcoming, in George W. Bush’s words, the “soft bigotry of low expectations”9 and serving as “the 
civil rights issue of our time”10 according to Duncan. Yet reform actions in Chicago have 
disproportionately harmed those students who were supposed to benefit. For instance, almost 90% 
of students affected by CPS school actions like school closures or turnarounds since 2001 are 
African American. The vast majority of those students landed in schools that were no better than 
                                                   
6 Shipps, Dorothy. School Reform, Corporate Style. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006),  14. 
7 Au, Wayne. “Teaching Under the New Taylorism: High-­‐Stakes Testing and the Standardization of the 21st Century 
Curriculum.” Journal of Curriculum Studies  43:1 (2011): 25-45. 
8 Duncan, Arne. “Turning around the bottom five percent.” Presentation to the National Alliance for Public Charter 
Schools Conference, Washington, D.C., June 22, 2009. Retrieved January 16, 2013. 
http://www2.ed.gov/news/speeches/2009/06/06222009.html  
9 Bush, George, W. Presentation to 91st Annual Convention of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, Baltimore, MD, July 10, 2000. Retrieved January 16, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/onpolitics/elections/bushtext071000.htm  
10 Duncan, Arne. “Statement by U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan on the Passing of Civil Rights Leader Fred 
Shuttlesworth.” October 6, 2011. Retrieved January 16, 2013. http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/statement-us-
secretary-education-arne-duncan-passing-civil-rights-leader-fred-sh 
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the ones they left.11 Furthermore, the new Illinois teacher evaluation system mandated by a 2010 
law passed in response to RTTT was first instituted in Chicago in 2012 (91% non-white student 
population, 87% free/reduced lunch12), while higher scoring (and more affluent) school districts 
do not have to implement the system until 2016.13  
 
A second equally important element of this agenda is the persistent state of economic crisis 
that exists in urban areas that provides a powerful rhetorical opportunity for reform. Rather than 
focusing on structural poverty in urban neighborhoods resulting from decades of disinvestment 
and unemployment, news headlines tout school budget deficits. In Chicago, the budget elements 
of the crisis have been overstated, but reform has continued unabated. Though CPS has ended six 
of the last eight fiscal years with a budget surplus, the district again claimed a $1 billion deficit for 
fiscal 2014. The last time the district claimed a $1 billion deficit, in FY2011, the district ended the 
year with a more than $300 million surplus.14,15 Given Mayor Emanuel’s proclivity for capitalizing 
on crisis—“never let a serious crisis go to waste”16 Emanuel has said—corporate efficiency models 
steam forward and intensify even though the educational results lag. This approach has a long 
history in Chicago: “Agendas less likely to affect pedagogy and student performance are easier to 
bring to fruition because they require only narrow coalitions to sustain and draw on resources in 
the hands of an elite.”17 
 
The Legal Framework for Corporate School Reform in Chicago 
  
Four specific legislative initiatives passed since 1995 provide the legal framework for the 
current Chicago reform model and help define the teaching and learning conditions against which 
Chicago’s teachers struck. The first two laws were enacted during the only time in the past thirty 
years the Republican Party simultaneously held the Illinois Governor’s office and majorities in the 
General Assembly. The second two passed in response to the conditions created by the 
Obama/Duncan Department of Education’s RTTT initiative and a notable surge in corporate-
funded educational advocacy groups. 
  
                                                   
11 De la Torre, Marisa and Julia Gwynne. When Schools Close: Effects on Displaced Students in Chicago Public Schools. 
Chicago: Consortium on Chicago School Research, 2009. Accessed January 16, 2013. 
http://ccsr.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/publications/CCSRSchoolClosings-Final.pdf 
12 Chicago Public Schools. “Stats and facts.” Accessed January 24, 2013. http://cps.edu/About_CPS/At-a-
glance/Pages/Stats_and_facts.aspx  
13 Performance Evaluation Advisory Council. “Timeline.” Retrieved January 16, 2013. 
http://www.isbe.state.il.us/peac/html/timeline.htm  
14 Ahmed, Azam. (2010). “CPS faces $1 billion deficit, Huberman says.” Chicago Tribune. February 25, 2010. Accessed 
January 15, 2013. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-02-25/news/ct-met-chicago-school-cuts-
20100225_1_pension-system-pension-reform-furlough-days and  
15 Chicago Public Schools. Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for the Year Ended June 30,2011. (Chicago: Chicago 
Public Schools), 81. Accessed January 15, 2013. 
http://cps.edu/About_CPS/Financial_information/Documents/FY11_CAFR.pdf 
16 YouTube. “Rahm Emanuel Says Never Let a Good Crisis Go to Waste.” Accessed January 15, 2013. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rs6TgitlNIA  
17 Shipps, School Reform Corporate Style, 2. 
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The first major reform initiative of this period was the 1995 amendatory act to the school 
code, a move fully supported by then-Mayor Richard M. Daley. This amendatory act instituted 
broad changes to CPS governance, including full mayoral control over the schools,18 the 
appointment of a chief executive officer (CEO) who was “a person of recognized administrative 
ability and management experience” to run the district,19 significant limitation on the subjects of 
collective bargaining, changing items like service contracting (outsourcing), reduction-in-force, class 
size, and staffing levels from mandatory subjects of bargaining to permissive subjects of bargaining 
at “the sole discretion of the educational employer,”20 an 18-month ban on CTU strikes,21 and the 
provision for the CEO to place schools on probation and recommend interventions that included 
replacing all school staff or closing the school.22  
 
The second major reform law was the 1996 charter school law. This law allowed for the 
creation of charter schools in Illinois with a specific focus on Chicago.23 The law has been 
amended several times since its enactment to broaden its scope. Most charter schools are allocated 
to Chicago (75 out of 120),24 despite the fact that the city educates only about one-fifth of the 
state’s students. Charter school teachers are forbidden by law from joining the Chicago Teachers 
Union and the district does not have to negotiate with the CTU over the creation of new charter 
schools.25 In addition, charter schools are not required to have fully-certified staffs; initially, charter 
schools could hire 50 percent non-certified teachers, which was later raised to 75percent.26 The 
1995 amendatory act and 1996 charter law paved the way for the Daley era of corporate school 
reform.  
 
Two additional laws establishing the reform framework were passed more recently. In 
January 2010, Illinois enacted the Performance Evaluation Reform Act (PERA) as a condition of 
the state’s (failed) RTTT application. PERA changed teachers’ and administrators’ evaluation 
process, requiring for the first time that “student performance data to be a significant factor in 
teacher or principal evaluations,” and defined “significant factor” as at least 30percent of a 
teacher’s evaluation. Districts and union locals that cannot agree to how much weighting student 
performance data should receive in teacher or principal evaluations default to the state model, 
which equally weights student growth and teacher practice.27 PERA also requires that teachers 
receive one of four ratings: excellent, proficient, needs improvement, or unsatisfactory. 
  
                                                   
18 Illinois General Assembly. “Illinois Compiled Statutes (ILCS 5/34-3).” Accessed January 17, 2013. 
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs.asp 
19 ILCS 5/34-3.3 
20 ILCS 5/4.5 
21 ILCS 5/13 
22 ILCS 5/34-8.3 
23 ILCS 5/27A 
24 ILCS 5/27A-4 
25 ILCS 5/27A-4.J 
26 ILCS 5/27A-10 
27 Illinois General Assembly. “Illinois Public Act 096-0861.” Accessed January 17, 2013. 
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/96/pdf/096-0861.pdf 
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PERA itself does not have any real consequences for teachers or administrators. The law 
defines the parameters of new evaluation systems but does not contain any penalties for low 
ratings. However, with  Senate Bill 7 (SB7) passed in 2011, the state legislature enacted sweeping 
school reform. SB7 enshrined several corporate governance goals in state law. First, SB7 tied high-
stakes consequences to evaluations. Teachers who receive two unsatisfactory ratings within a seven-
year period automatically lose their teaching license. Tenure acquisition was toughened, as new 
teachers must have at least two proficient ratings in their first four years to achieve tenure. 
Reductions-in-force are now tied to teachers’ performance ratings rather than seniority.28 The 
legislation also changed the collective bargaining process between teachers’ unions and school 
boards. One major change was that both sides’ final offers must be posted to the public for at least 
two weeks. The law also established a completely different negotiating process for CPS than the 
rest of the state. Under SB7, CTU and CPS are required to undertake a complex fact finding 
process if an impasse is declared, and CTU is required to get a vote of 75 percent of the entire 
active membership to be able to strike. Anyone who does not vote is automatically counted as a 
“no” vote. Under the old law, teachers could strike if 50 percent of those voting voted yes. 
Furthermore, SB7 gave Mayor Emanuel the unilateral right to extend the length of the school day 
and year.  
 
SB7 resulted from serious pressure by corporate reform organizations, especially Stand for 
Children (SFC). SFC was founded by Jonah Edelman, son of the well-known founder of the 
Children Defense Fund. Initially, SFC was an Oregon-based grassroots education advocacy 
organization, but as the organization expanded, it morphed into a corporate school reform 
proponent. SFC’s method in Illinois was to dole out millions of dollars in campaign contributions 
in state House and Senate races and then use those contributions to influence education policy, as 
evidenced by SB7. Edelman boasted at a 2011 Aspen Institute panel that SB7 effectively rendered 
unions powerless on education policy:  
 
Our proposal was a very high threshold for strikes. For whatever reason, a tactical 
miscalculation on [Karen Lewis’] part, was palatable. Rahm pushed it…. The threshold we 
were arguing for was three-quarters. So in effect, they wouldn’t have the ability to strike 
even though the right was maintained. And so in the end-game the Chicago Teachers 
Union took that deal, probably not knowing the statistics about voting history…. It’s going 
to allow the new mayor to lengthen the day and year as much as they want. The unions in 
Chicago cannot strike.29  
 
Ultimately, it was Edelman who made a tactical miscalculation. 
 
Corporate School Reform in Practice during the Daley and Emanuel Administrations 
 
                                                   
28 Illinois Association of School Boards. “SB7/SB630 Analysis.” Accessed January 17, 2013. 
www.iasb.com/govrel/sb7analysis.pdf 
29 YouTube. “Billionaire J. Crown (Obama’s Senate Campaign Financier) ‘We Got Money’ 2 privatize education.” 
Retrieved April 25, 2013. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B2koz78pj7Y 
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Chicago’s school policymakers capitalized on this legal framework to reshape CPS 
governance and sold these changes with the rhetoric of education reform. Mayoral control as 
practiced during Richard M. Daley’s tenure became the blueprint for mayoral control in cities 
across the country, standardized testing expanded, “failing” schools became subject to dramatic 
actions like closure or turnaround, and charter schools proliferated at a startling rate. In short, 
Chicago became a national model for school reform, even though the academic results are mixed 
at best.30   
 
The Daley Years 
 Mayor Daley was granted full decision-making power over CPS in 1995. While Chicago 
was not the origin of mayoral control, the Chicago model did spread to other cities, notably 
Baltimore, New York, and Washington, D.C.31 Three CEOs led CPS during Daley’s tenure, none 
of whom had any experience as a teacher or school administrator prior to assuming the post. Paul 
Vallas was Daley’s former budget director and was considered “decisive.”32 Arne Duncan was a 
former professional basketball player in Australia and was Vallas’ chief of staff.33 Ron Huberman 
had been a Chicago police officer, Daley’s chief of staff, the head of the Chicago Transit 
Authority, and was considered a data expert.34 Despite their dearth of experience in education, 
Daley sold his CEOs as expert managers of large organizations. Most teachers on the ground 
viewed them as unqualified “pinstripe patronage” hires: they were there to implement Daley’s 
vision of school reform. 
 
Several key governance changes that later had national implications were implemented and 
refined during this period. Vallas introduced a “no excuses” framework of punitive accountability 
that persists today. This model links student promotion and school probation to high stakes tests 
and permits the “reconstitution” of failing schools deemed to be in crisis. These policies set the 
stage for further expansion and intensification of punitive accountability measures in subsequent 
CPS administrations, and today’s national reform culture germinated during this period. First, 
Vallas instituted a “back-to-basics” curriculum measured by standardized tests as the key 
accountability measure for students. Students who did not reach a passing score on the Iowa Test 
of Basic Skills could be denied promotion and were forced to attend summer school. Failure of 
summer school, as measured by the test score, resulted in grade retention.35 Scripted curricula and 
test-prep were common, especially for students who had failed the promotion test. Failed eighth 
graders who were too old for elementary schools were sent to “transition centers”; 98.5percent of 
                                                   
30 Woestehoff, Julie and Monty Neill. Chicago School Reform: Lessons for the Nation. Chicago: Parents United for 
Responsible Education, 2007. Accessed April 25, 2013. http://pureparents.org/data/files/Final%20report.pdf 
31 Haney, Leviis. "The 1995 Chicago School Reform Amendatory Act and the CPS CEO: A Historical Examination of 
the Administration of CEOs Paul Vallas and Arne Duncan." PhD. diss., Loyola University Chicago, 2011. Accessed 
January 24, 2013. http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/62 
32 Woestehoff and Neill,  Chicago School Reform, 12.  
33 Leviis, “The 1995 Chicago School Reform Amendatory Act.” 
34 Blitstein, Ryan. “Numbers Man.” Chicago Magazine. August 2009. Accessed January 24, 2013. 
http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/August-2009/Numbers-Man/  
35 Leviis, “The 1995 Chicago School Reform Amendatory Act.” 
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those students were African American or Latino.36 Second, test scores were used to punish entire 
schools by placing them on probation, which meant more basic skills training and more testing for 
students. When the first probation list was published in 1996, 109 of 557 CPS schools were on 
it.37 For schools with fewer than 15percent of students scoring as proficient, Vallas proposed 
reconstitution, or the dismissal of all school staff who then had to reapply for their jobs. Seven 
high schools were reconstituted in 1997: DuSable, Englewood, Harper, King, Orr, Phillips, and 
Robeson.38 Portending the future pattern of school actions, all of those schools met the definition 
of what UCLA professor Gary Orfield terms highly-segregated “Apartheid schools” – schools made 
up of 99percent or more students of color (in these cases, almost all African American).39 Despite 
the reconstitutions, the schools continued to struggle, and every single school on this list would 
later face another intensive intervention. In short, Vallas developed and implemented the school 
testing and school sanction elements of corporate school reform in Chicago.  
 
Arne Duncan intensified these elements, added charter school proliferation to the mix, 
and turned over policy decision-making to corporate interests. Duncan was appointed CPS CEO 
in June 2001 after Vallas left the position. His tenure was marked by several corporate reform 
efforts named Renaissance 2010 (Ren10). This reform was a two-pronged approach that combined 
school closures with rapid charter school expansion: 60 public schools would be closed and 100 
new schools would be opened, two-thirds of which would be privately operated charter and 
contract schools.40 Ren10 emerged from the Civic Committee’s 2003 report Left Behind. The 
report lambasted low test scores in Chicago’s schools and declared the system an outright failure. 
While the report acknowledged the high level of poverty in the city, it downplayed the clear role 
poverty plays in student test scores and recommended as a solution to Chicago’s educational 
problems competition between schools that could only occur through a massive expansion of 
“choice”: 100 new charter schools in inner city neighborhoods and the end of union contracts that 
obstructed progress.41 Omitted from Left Behind was an admission of the Civic Committee’s 
century-old role in Chicago educational governance.42 Indeed, the report’s signatories included the 
CEO of Exelon, the former chairman of LaSalle Bank, the former CEO of Illinois Tool Works, 
and the chairman and CEO of the Chicago Board Options Exchange. Ren10 effectively gave these 
corporate executives intensive sway over education policy in Chicago.   
 
                                                   
36 Woestehoff and Neill, Chicago School Reform,13 
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Ren10 fundamentally changed CPS’s governance structure: it privatized a major portion of 
the district in mainly African American parts of the city, it stratified the district by adding large 
numbers of selective schools, and it more directly linked standardized test performance to school 
actions. The privatization program was part of a larger attempt to gentrify the city, especially areas 
around former Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) public housing complexes.43 For instance, 20 of 
22 schools near the CHA’s demolished State Street corridor in Bronzeville were slated for 
closure.44 Major residential developments were planned for these same areas, with starting home 
prices significantly outside the range of the then-residents’ affordability.45 Many closed public 
schools were deliberately replaced with selective, non-union charters where students were admitted 
by lottery and union contracts could not limit the length of day or year.46  To finance this massive 
expansion of private charters, the Civic Committee founded New Schools for Chicago and 
pumped $50 million into charter start-ups.47  
 
The Ren10 plan for school expansion would have lost much of its expansionary 
justification if not for school actions like closures, phase-outs, and turnarounds. In order to 
radically reshape school governance, Duncan needed a measure and a method, and for this he 
turned to Vallas. Federal NCLB guidelines based on actions pioneered during the Vallas years 
allowed Duncan to take drastic actions against schools that did not meet adequate yearly progress 
(AYP). Duncan used the law’s various provisions like a hammer against allegedly failing schools. 
The first actions occurred in 2002, when Duncan closed three elementary schools. The students 
were practically all African American and predominately low income. Two schools were located in 
the CHA’s State Street corridor, while the third was near a demolished West Side public housing 
complex.48 This experience became the test case for closures under Ren10, and in many cases the 
same schools that had been on probation and subject to intervention during the Vallas years were 
subject to further experimentation during the Duncan years. For instance, Englewood High School 
was deemed a failure and was “phased out” beginning in 2005. Teachers (including this author) 
were laid-off over a period of three years. The building was renovated and then turned over to an 
all-boys charter school. Another Vallas retread, reconstitution, was renamed turnaround, with the 
same conditions: all employees would be fired and forced to reapply for their jobs. Harper, Orr, 
and Philips high schools went through the turnaround process about a decade after they had been 
reconstituted. Almost two dozen other schools have gone through the process through 2013. The 
predominantly veteran, African American staffs were replaced with significantly younger, and 
significantly whiter, teachers. An analysis of CPS seniority lists showed that in turnarounds 
completed after the 2011-12 school year the average age of teachers in the ten schools dropped 
from 45 to 32, and the average experience dropped from 12 years to under 4 years. Fifty-six 
percent of teachers in those schools were African American before the turnarounds; 38percent 
                                                   
43 Lipman and Haines, “From Accountability.” 
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were African American after the turnarounds.49 Despite the policy’s negative impacts, turnaround 
became a main intervention option in RTTT. 
 
Another Duncan “innovation” was to further turn over district decision-making to 
corporate interests. Spurred by large contributions, CPS undertook two Gates Foundation-
sponsored reforms in the early and mid-2000s: multiple small high schools in one building and 
“high school transformation.” Reconstituted high schools DuSable and Orr were two of several 
high schools turned into “multiplex” campuses with multiple small schools in one building. The 
Gates Foundation worked from the premise that small schools would foster tighter relationships 
among students, teachers, and parents and drive better test results. Gates funding was eliminated 
after a few years and small schools were abandoned when results did not follow. The Gates 
Foundation’s other Duncan-era reform, High School Transformation, theorized that a robust, 
dynamic, and engaging curriculum would dramatically improve high school students’ performance. 
Once-reconstituted Robeson was one of more than 40 schools subjected to the highly-scripted 
instructional development system (IDS) curriculum.50 Results did not match expectations, 
however, and a Gates-funded assessment of High School Transformation found that inconsistent 
student attendance, classroom disruptions, technology outages, and poor central office 
implementation were significant impediments to success.51 Left out of the report was the fact that 
the district had eliminated truant officers almost a decade prior, as were any discussions of other 
causes of student absenteeism. 
 
Two pieces of evidence point to the fact that Ren10 did not markedly change school 
results. First, Ren10’s flimsy academic justification demonstrated that the Vallas governance 
changes were ineffective – new school actions were undertaken soon after the initial actions 
occurred, even though the new actions were practically the same as the old ones. Second, the Civic 
Committee released its own report, entitled Still Left Behind, and argued that CPS’ performance 
remained dismal. The Civic Committee’s solution? A more intensified version of Ren10, 
particularly an expansion of school choice through the rapid creation of additional charter 
schools.52 Clearly, the corporate reform model was not driving dramatic education improvements, 
but Ren10 did rapidly expand privatization of public assets, and given Ren10’s biggest proponents’ 
own statements of the need for competition and choice, privatization was the goal.53 By the end of 
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Duncan’s term, dozens of public schools had been closed and dozens of privately-run charters had 
been opened, standardized testing had been expanded, and hundreds of jobs had been outsourced. 
It was on this record that Arne Duncan was promoted to US Secretary of Education in January 
2009.  
 
Despite massive political and corporate support, Ren10’s expansion was not guaranteed. 
Ren10 was devastating for thousands of students and families across the city, and parents, teachers, 
and community organizations protested vigorously. Particularly poignant was testimony and 
actions that occurred at the legally-required hearings for each school action. A teacher from 
Whittier elementary on Chicago’s Southwest Side explained the real-world implications of 
seemingly innocuous school changes: 
 
In your maps, Finkl seems like a very close school. But in reality, some of our students will 
have to walk up to a mile to be able to get there. In your maps that you see CPS, you do 
not see all the gang signs and all the gang boundaries that our kids are going to have to 
walk through to get to Finkl. You have to put a face to that. Our kids are going to be 
walking through very, very dangerous areas just to be able to get to a new school.54 
 
Conspicuously absent from the Ren10 protests was a consistently organized response from the 
CTU. The union’s leadership did little during that time to challenge the policy. Teachers worked 
outside the union’s official structure to oppose school actions. It was not until the current union 
leadership was elected in June 2010 that the union began to more actively oppose corporate school 
reform policies. 
 
Ron Huberman’s tenure as CPS CEO differed little from the Duncan era. Ren10 school 
action policies continued and intensified, but two initiatives particularly frustrated and outraged 
teachers. The first was a major intensification of data collection and sorting. Labeled performance 
management, Huberman was convinced that data-driven decision making could radically improve 
schools.55 Performance management included the development of a wide array of measurements 
and the attempted quantification of as many educational processes as possible. Huberman was 
keen on sharing rankings and ratings. His method also involved regular meetings where principals 
and teachers would be intensively grilled about particular data points. Teachers and administrators 
viewed performance management meetings as a trap rather than a tool of school improvement, as 
the outcomes were often harsh rebukes rather than constructive feedback.  The second Huberman 
policy was a major reduction in the teaching staff. In 2010, Huberman claimed that a massive 
budget deficit necessitated cutting 2,700 teaching positions and raising class sizes to 35 students. 
Teachers would be laid off by performance instead of seniority, in violation of the existing union 
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contract.56 The mass layoffs served as the first major test for the CTU leadership. The union 
immediately litigated and ultimately won, but 1,300 teachers were still laid off and not all were 
rehired.57 Huberman’s tenure was short-lived compared to the previous CEOs; he announced his 
resignation soon after Daley announced his retirement as mayor. 
 
The Emanuel Administration 
 
Rahm Emanuel was elected mayor of Chicago in February of 2011. Emanuel forged tight 
ties to corporate interests during his time as an investment banker, and his campaign advisors 
included executives like Bruce Rauner, a private-equity manager, charter school namesake, and 
Republican candidate in the 2014 Illinois Gubernatorial election. Emanuel’s education platform 
was basically a continuation of the Daley years and contained one main talking point: because of 
an overly short school day and school year, Chicago students were in school almost four fewer 
years than comparable students in Houston.58 Emanuel pledged to end this travesty in two ways: 
lengthen the school day and year, and force Chicago’s teachers to work this extra time for no 
additional pay. In June 2011, soon after taking office, Emanuel appointed a new school board and 
one of their first acts was to deny teachers a contractually-agreed four percent raise. Teachers were 
outraged, and the status of the raise was the first major conflict between teachers and the mayor. 
In July 2011, the truth behind Emanuel’s Houston statement came to light. In the same speech as 
he bragged the CTU could not strike Jonah Edelman, SFC executive director, admitted that he 
had made up the statistic.59 The mayor nonetheless pushed forward with his plan, and the longer 
school day became the second major conflict between Emanuel and the CTU. The union sued the 
district when thirteen “Pioneer Schools” were tricked into accepting a longer day in violation of 
the union contract. The mayor settled in early November, but conflict only intensified when 
contract negotiations between Emanuel’s hand-picked school board and the CTU began later that 
month. 
 
Given these initial conflicts, CTU prepared for a protracted contract struggle. The union 
built connections with community and parent organizations across Chicago by defending public 
schools, opposing charter expansion, and advocating for full school supports like smaller class 
sizes, a reduction in testing, non-scripted, engaging curricula, wrap-around services like counseling 
and healthcare, and capital improvements like a library and air conditioning in every school. The 
union appealed to communities that saw fifteen years of negative reform effects and actively 
opposed all corporate-backed school actions. The union also undertook an internal reorganization 
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that included the creation of organizing and research departments to develop the capacity for a 
strike. 
 
Negotiations 
 
The negotiating climate was intense throughout 2012. Chicago’s school board and mayor, 
in conjunction with aforementioned reform groups, attempted to vilify Chicago’s teachers. The 
mayor and his allies even went so far as to pay protestors to testify in support of school closings.60 
Bargaining table tactics were equally cutthroat. The school board’s first contract offer in February 
2012 gutted the existing contract, as the board proposed a 25-page contract to replace a 250-page 
contract developed over four decades of negotiations. The proposed contract would have 
eliminated all contractual protections, did not explain how the longer day and year would work, 
and contained a pay offer with a one-time raise of 2 percent for a 20 percent increase in work. 
While contract proposals tend to be more aggressive early in the process and eventually move to a 
mutually agreeable position, bargaining team members felt that the Board’s initial offer was an 
insult. Despite multiple negotiating sessions, little about the contract had changed by May. Late 
that month, the CTU held a rally and march of more than 10,000 teachers and supporters 
through downtown Chicago. After the march, the district began to move – a little. Negotiations 
moved a bit further in early June, after the union took its strike authorization vote. Far exceeding 
SB7’s minimum threshold, CTU got more than 90 percent of the entire membership to vote in 
favor of going on strike; 98 percent of those who voted said they would strike. CPS opposed the 
vote’s timing, but the law did not specify when a vote had to occur. In July, a fact finder’s report 
included a verdict that rejected the Board’s pay proposals and recommended teacher pay raises of 
16% for the proposed new calendar. A minor breakthrough happened in late July, when the Board 
agreed to hire hundreds of additional teachers to staff physical education, music, and art classes to 
staff the longer school day, but high stakes teacher evaluations and teacher retention in the event 
of school closings remained major sticking points through August. Late that month, CTU’s house 
of delegates overwhelmingly voted to authorize a strike date. CTU officers set that date for 
September 10th. On Labor Day, a rally expected to draw a few thousand actually drew 18,000 
people. Labor and community organizations came out to support Chicago’s teachers. School 
started the following day, and the board and union continued to negotiate through that week. 
These intense negotiations did not generate the required contract terms, however, and late 
September 9th, CTU president Karen Lewis announced that Chicago’s teachers would strike for 
the first time since 1987. 
 
The Strike 
 
By 6:30am on September 10th, teachers were walking picket lines at almost 600 schools 
across the city. Rather than have students attend every school, CPS designated about 140 schools 
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as student holding centers. Student attendance at these locations was very low, and many students 
(including some of my former students at John Hope High School) walked picket lines rather than 
enter the buildings. That afternoon, CTU staged the first of four major demonstrations. 20,000 
teachers and supporters, the vast majority in red t-shirts, marched through the streets of Chicago’s 
central business district, snarling traffic and drawing nationwide media attention. Unlike many 
demonstrations in recent years that featured an adversarial relationship between Chicago police 
and protesters, the marches during the teachers strike were fully supported by police. Many officers 
I spoke with were glad that someone was willing to challenge the mayor, especially since the police 
and fire fighters’ contracts were the next ones to be negotiated. A similar scene played out on 
Tuesday and Wednesday that week. Rather than picket each school, teachers picketed at the 
student holding centers in the morning and then held huge demonstrations downtown. Many 
schools’ staffs further took their grievances directly to their elected officials. Teachers picketed 
outside at least thirty aldermen’s offices that week, and those officials who signed a letter against 
the strike were particularly targeted. One school staff protested their alderman multiple times after 
he disparaged the strike during an appearance on Fox News.  
 
The mood during both morning pickets and afternoon marches was upbeat, determined, 
and even festive. For thousands of teachers, the strike was the first public expression of their 
political beliefs. Those teachers learned from the hundreds who had participated in the last 
Chicago teachers strike. One father even carried a sign with a picture of him and his son during 
the 1987 strike. That son is now a CPS teacher and the two were on strike together. Regardless of 
experience, the strike was an opportunity for teachers to express their frustration with years of 
corporate school reform. A widely circulated blog post from a CPS teacher described multiple 
reasons for his striking and represented thousands of teachers’ motivations: under-resourced 
schools, weeks of instruction lost to testing, the longer school day without sufficient supports, 
destructive school turnarounds, diversion of public education funds to private interests, and 
understaffing of schools.61 Homemade signs and strike chants, as well as thousands of Facebook 
and Twitter posts, also pointed toward teachers’ reasons for striking. Some emphasized general 
disrespect shown toward teachers, some spoke toward specific policy decisions, some cited the 
history of protest in the U.S. Many targeted the mayor directly. Furthermore, the strike’s message 
resonated beyond teachers. In an era where major strikes are exceedingly rare, the CTU strike 
enjoyed broad and deep support. At some picket locations, seemingly every passing car honked in 
support. National and international support poured in, as the CTU received messages of solidarity 
from teachers unions in New York, Paris, China, Canada, and cities across the U.S., and hundreds 
of people and organizations made monetary contributions to the CTU’s solidarity fund. And 
despite the hassle and inconvenience the strike created, a majority of Chicagoans and a two-thirds 
majority of CPS parents, supported the CTU’s strike. Such an outpouring of support helped fuel 
teachers’ resolve, as only about 20 people scabbed, or crossed picket lines, over the seven-day strike. 
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On Friday of the strike’s first week, after teachers led five days of strong pickets, huge 
demonstrations, and a day of canvassing neighborhoods most impacted by education reform, the 
Board finally presented an offer that the union’s officers felt comfortable putting to a vote. CTU 
held another rally and march the following day on the city’s West Side, and on Sunday the offer 
was presented to the union’s House of Delegates. After heated discussion, the House voted to stay 
on strike to provide teachers the opportunity to read and discuss the proposed terms. This delay 
outraged city leaders, and the Mayor brought an injunction to the Cook County circuit court. The 
judge, however, refused to hear the city’s arguments. Teachers walked picket lines Monday and 
Tuesday. After pickets were done for the day, strike captains led contract discussion meetings in 
churches, parks, and other public places across the city. On September 18th, after those citywide 
discussions, the House of Delegates voted overwhelmingly to suspend the strike. Chicago’s 
teachers challenged a powerful discourse of education reform that was fully supported by the city’s 
political and business establishment, and won.  
 
Going Forward? 
 
The strike did not end corporate school reform in Chicago. Teachers won important 
provisions in the contract, but they also made key concessions. While the school day and year were 
not as long as the mayor would like, the school day and year were extended. The district agreed to 
hire additional art and music teachers to implement the longer school day, but the district did not 
hire additional school psychologists, social workers, and other clinicians. Teachers will follow 
students in school consolidations, but tenured teachers who lose their jobs to turnarounds receive 
significantly reduced benefits. CTU was able to limit the standardized testing component of 
teacher evaluations to the state minimum, but cut scores for excellent and proficient ratings are 
relatively high, which means many tenured teachers could face high-stakes sanctions and new 
teachers will have a much harder time receiving tenure. The Board would not negotiate class size 
reductions or restrictions on standardized testing. The Board also retains the power to undertake 
school actions, and in May 2013 the Board authorized the largest single group of school closings in 
U.S. history. Contract enforcement has also been a challenge; some principals have claimed that 
the new contract does not exist until they receive a finalized printed book. On the balance, 
however, the strike and the resulting contract were clear victories for teachers and students.  
 
A key question remains: why did the strike open a national conversation about corporate 
school reform? Cities across the country had been subjected to reforms for so long that a better 
description might be “corporate status quo.” A major part of the answer has to do with the CTU’s 
message that the strike was a challenge to a reform model that had failed and harmed thousands of 
urban students across the country. The strike was the first teacher work stoppage directly related to 
the unfair effects of corporate school policy, and this challenge involved the active participation of 
a coalition of community and parent groups who backed the teachers’ vision for what school could 
and should be. Directly related to this message is the clear chasm between school for the affluent 
and school for the poor. Contrast the corporate reform model to the University of Chicago Lab 
Schools’ approach. According to the Lab Schools’ mission statement: 
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The University of Chicago Laboratory Schools provide an experience-
centered, rigorous and well-rounded education for a diverse community. 
Recognizing that students have a variety of needs at each developmental 
stage and learn in different ways, the Schools are committed to help each 
student: 
• Learn to think critically and creatively 
• Cultivate a passion for excellence in academics, the arts, and 
athletics 
• Master important subject matter 
• Achieve a sense of emotional and physical well-being 
• Celebrate both our cultural differences and our common 
humanity 
• Gain a sense of personal and community responsibility 
• Develop a life-long love of learning62 
 
Mayor Emanuel’s children, President Obama’s children, and US Secretary of Education Arne 
Duncan all currently attend or previously attended the Lab Schools. Yearly tuition at the Lab 
Schools is more than $25,000. In other words, affluent children are spared the experimentation 
and harm that flows from the reform agenda at the same time their parents push it for others.  
 
Another part of the answer was a sense that governance reforms like NCLB and RTTT are 
intensifying, despite the reforms’ questionable record. A major problem for corporate reformers is 
that reforms pushed by perceived outsiders, especially when the changes have little educational 
benefit, face intense skepticism and high barriers to implementation.  Corporate school reforms 
have been imposed on those students and families that have been systematically denied resources 
and supports for decades even though the “achievement gap” was reduced most dramatically 
during the period of desegregation and anti-poverty efforts during the 1970s and early 1980s.63 Yet, 
even with the clear success of integration and investment, no similar program is proposed today. 
Reform supporters are beginning to question the current approach, too. The American Enterprise 
Institute’s Rick Hess wrote, “After failing miserably to convince suburban and middle-class voters 
that reforms designed for dysfunctional urban systems and at-risk kids are good for their children 
and their schools, Common Core advocates now evince an eerie confidence that they 
can scare these voters into embracing the ‘reform’ agenda” (emphasis original).64 Stories of 
corporate reform success have omitted these larger trends and obfuscated reforms’ negative 
consequences. Absent from the reform discussion of public education is that public school has 
worked for millions of people, and it can work for millions more when done effectively. 
                                                   
62 University of Chicago Laboratory Schools. “Mission Statement.” Accessed January 24, 2013. 
http://www.ucls.uchicago.edu/about-lab/mission-statement/index.aspx 
63 Orfield, Gary. (2006). Foreword to Tracking achievement gaps and assessing the impact of NCLB on the gaps: An in-depth 
look into national and state reading and math outcome trends by Jaekyung Lee, 5-9. Cambridge, MA: The Civil Rights 
Project at Harvard University. Accessed January 25, 2013. http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED491807.pdf 
64 Hess, Frederick. “The Common Core Kool-Aid.” Rick Hess Straight Up, November 30, 2012. Retrieved 12/6/12 
from http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/rick_hess_straight_up/2012/11/the_common_core_kool-aid.html  
17
Hilgendorf: Striking Back Against Corporate Education Reform: The 2012 Chicag
Published by The Keep, 2013
 The Councilor: A Journal of the Social Studies 
Vol. 74, No. 2 (2013) 
18 
 
The national push back against corporate reform has spread quickly since last fall. Teachers 
in several suburban Chicago districts struck in the months following the CTU strike. Teachers at 
Garfield High School in Seattle refused to give a standardized test they viewed as unfair, and their 
boycott spread to other cities. The Texas State House of Representatives zeroed-out the 2013 
budget line for standardized testing in order to challenge its continued use. California Governor 
Jerry Brown used his 2013 State of the State speech to decry labyrinthine accountability systems 
and unequal school funding. The CTU strike and subsequent efforts have by no means settled the 
battle over corporate school reform, but reformers’ momentum has been notably slowed as people 
across the country have context, models, and inspiration for defending the true soul of public 
education. George Washington, in his first address to Congress in 1790, said that it was crucial to 
teach people “to value their own rights” and “to distinguish between oppression and the necessary 
exercise of lawful authority.” Scripted curricula and test prep usually do not teach those concepts, 
but having experienced the strike first-hand, walking a picket line does. 
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